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Abstract
This paper analyses the welfare implications for a developing country of using union
legalisation as a policy instrument to attract inward foreign direct investment.  While its
presence may discourage a foreign multinational (MNE) from locating in the host country,
unionisation is an important rent-extracting instrument for the host country. We show that if
the MNE benefits from dynamic effects, the host country government may have an incentive
to adopt temporary social dumping: banning the union in the short run to extract higher rents
in the future. However, if the government can use a fiscal instrument in conjunction with
union legalisation, the former can circumvent the need to engage in social dumping.
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11. INTRODUCTION
A significant proportion of the discussion on globalisation, defined as an expansion of
both cross-border transactions in goods and services and international capital flows, has
centred on its effects on the labour markets. Low labour costs are often seen as a key factor
in determining the ability of a country to compete for export markets and for foreign direct
investment (FDI). Indeed, the growing importance of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in
world markets signifies that the competitive pressure has, to an extent, shifted from firms
themselves to workers in different countries bidding for their jobs with the same
multinational firm.
Labour organisations in industrial countries typically fear that the increased
competition from countries where labour standards are low or not enforced will lead to a
“race to the bottom” which will compromise labour standards in industrial countries as well.
These fears are strengthened by the perceived LDCs’ governments’ reticence to ratify and
implement International Labour Conventions. Many LDCs have in fact shown opposition to
the establishment of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms to their labour practices by the
International Labour Organisation1, worrying that the industrialised nations leading the
charge for these mechanisms to be set up could use them as protectionist tools to dull
developing nations’ competitive advantages based on low labour costs. This suggests that, in
particular in those regions which have to a great extent been bypassed by inward FDI flows
(such as Africa and South-Asia), governments may strategically choose to repress
unionisation and to pursue low labour standards in their attempt to preserve and/or enhance
their competitiveness in goods and FDI markets.
The aim of this paper is to explore the possibility of the strategic use of labour
standards by a developing country’s government trying to attract inward FDI.  To our
knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the strategic use of standards as a policy
instrument.
In the emerging literature on labour standards and international trade even when
endogenously determined, as for example in Casella, (1996) and Srinivasan (1996), standards
are not treated as a policy variable. Similarly, the relatively small but growing literature
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  The 86th International Labour Conference (June 1998) has adopted a Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work, committing ILO’s members to uphold fundamental rights in the workplace
(freedom of association, right to collective bargaining, progressive elimination of forms of forced labour,
child labour and discrimination).
2which explores the relationship between labour market unionisation and FDI ignores the
possibility of the government’s strategic use of union legislation2.
To start addressing the issue of the optimal use of labour standards as trade policy
instruments, we construct a simple model in which a developing country’s government
makes strategic use of labour union legalisation to influence the optimal behaviour of a
foreign multinational which may potentially locate in the country. The model does not aim at
providing an exhaustive analysis of the optimal use of standards to attract FDI, but rather to
highlight the nature of some of the factors affecting a government’s economic incentives to
regulate unionisation.
Leaving aside political economy considerations, unions may generate a trade-off for
the host country’s government3. On the one hand, they represent an important means of rent
extraction. A Multinational Enterprise (MNE) will typically hold firm specific “rent-yielding
assets” (Caves, 1996) and the prospect of rent shifting may thus be attractive to both the
host country government and unions4. On the other hand a “union free environment”, which
is typically associated with lower wages, may be seen as useful by the host country’s
government in its attempt to attract and retain MNEs’ investment5.
In this paper we allow for the possibility that the MNE benefits from dynamic effects,
for example such as consumer switching costs, brand loyalty, learning by doing. In this
context, the host government may have an incentive to temporarily subsidise the MNE in
order to enhance future potential rent-extraction. One, indirect, way of doing this may be
through “social dumping”: banning the union in the short run may yield greater rents in the
long run.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic model and discusses
the optimal policy with respect to union legalisation. In Section 3, a jointly optimal policy
                                               
2
  See Zhao (1995, 1998) for the emergence of cross-hauling FDI between two unionised countries. Naylor
and Santoni (1998) analyse the effects of union power and degree of substitutability between products on
FDI. Leahy and Montagna (1998) investigate the effects of different degrees of wage setting centralisation
on the investment and location decisions of a MNE.
3
 Although the presence of unions may raise political economy considerations, we shall use the standard
assumption that the government is a benevolent national welfare maximiser.
4
  Katrak (1977) and Brander and Spencer (1981) analyse the use of rent-extracting tariffs in the presence of
a foreign monopoly selling in the domestic market. Bughin and Vannini (1995) and Leahy and Montagna
(1998) explore the relationship between unionisation and rent extraction from a foreign multinational.
5
  On balance, governments see inward FDI as desirable, even in the absence of union rent extraction. MNEs
are seen as a source of employment and will  typically pay higher wages than local firms even in the
absence of unionisation, due perhaps to efficiency wage considerations or other factors. Additionally,
MNEs are seen as generating positive  technological externalities, and procompetitive effects on industry.
3mix in which the government has the use of a subsidy/tax instrument is analysed. Section 4
draws some conclusions.
2. THE BASIC MODEL
To examine these issues we use a very simple two-period partial equilibrium model.
We assume one multinational  which is considering setting up in this developing economy to
serve export markets. The MNE uses local labour but does not sell in the local market. No
host country firms compete with the foreign multinational6. The two periods are linked
through dynamic economies of scale, in the sense that a higher first period output raises the
firm’s second period profits.
The host country’s government, which in principle would like to attract the foreign
firm, faces the dilemma of whether or not to legalise unions. At the beginning of each period
the government decides whether to allow unions or not for that period. In this section we
shall assume that the government does not have subsidy/tax instruments at its disposal and it
is only able to decide whether to allow the union or not. This assumption, is relaxed in the
next section.
Unions are assumed to maximise total labour rents by choice of the union wage. We
ignore issues arising from the relative bargaining power of unions and firms. Different
relative bargaining powers of unions and employers are not central to our concerns in this
paper and would complicate the analysis without yielding many additional insights. We also
assume a right-to-manage model where firms decide on the level of output.
Thus, the model has two periods and consists of a dynamic game between three
players, the host country’s government, the union, and the foreign multinational. We shall
allow for the possibility that both the government and the multinational may take a longer
term view than the labour unions whose main preoccupation may be short-term wage
increases and recognition. We shall also consider the case in which the union’s rate of time
preference is the same as that of the government and we shall compare the implications of
this alternative assumption for government policy towards unions.
In each period, the government first decides whether unions should be legalised or
not for the remainder of that period. In period one, following the government decision about
union legalisation, the MNE decides whether to locate in the host country or not. We assume
4that once the MNE sets up in the home country, it stays for the remainder of the game. We
thus rule out any relocation threat: if the MNE enters, it does not leave in period two7. If
unions exist, they decide on the wage in each period in order to maximise total union rents.
Finally, in each period the MNE chooses its output.
In period t (t=1,2) the demand function of the MNE in its export market is:
(1) q a pt t t= −
The MNE faces marginal cost ct  which  is constant in its current output.
In order to introduce a dynamic link between period one output and period two
profits, it proves useful to write the gap between the demand intercept and the marginal cost
as:
(2)  a c A qt t t t t− = − + >−ω β 1 0
where At  is a period specific constant,  β is a positive constant and ωt is period t wage. This
is the simplest way of introducing beneficial dynamic effects, which could arise on the
demand side and/or on the cost side as a result of consumers’ switching costs, brand loyalty,
experience effects, and distributional scale economies amongst other things. We shall further
assume that the MNE has a unit labour requirement, that is l qt t=  where lt  is the labour
employed by the multinational in the home country.
Note that At  can be seen as reflecting market size. Let α=A2/A1 capture the
evolution of At  over time. Clearly, α  will affect the host country’s rent extraction potential
from the MNE. If α<1, the extent of the market facing the MNE is shrinking over time, as
will  happen in a declining industry.
2.1. Period two
Period two begins with the government deciding whether to legalise the union for the
period. If legal, the union then chooses the wage. Finally, the MNE chooses the second
period output. The multistage game is solved in the usual way by backward induction.
In the final stage of the second period the MNE maximises period-two profit
( )p c q2 2 2− . The optimal output level is given by:
                                                                                                                                               
6
  Leahy and Montagna (1998) analyse direct product market competition between a foreign multinational
and domestic firms in the presence of rent extracting unions.
7
  This would be typical of an industry characterised by high sunk costs of entry, such as oil refinery and
extraction.
5(3) q A q2 2 2 12=
− +ω β
If the union does not exist, the wage paid by the MNE will be ω 2 0= ≥w . Without
loss of generality, we normalise the wage outside the multinational sector at zero. Hence, we
assume that w , the wage in the absence of a union, is not less than the opportunity cost of
labour in the country. If w >0 then even a non-unionised multinational pays wages above the
opportunity cost of labour. This is a reasonable assumption which conforms to the evidence
of MNEs paying higher wages than domestic firms (Caves, 1996). Let the union wage be
ω t tw= . We are assuming that employment and wages have the same weight in the unions’
utility function. One could allow for different weights and this would raise other interesting
considerations which, however, are not central to the aims of this paper. If the union exists in
the second period, then anticipating the relationship in equation (3) it chooses the union
wage w2  to maximise its second period labour rent 22qw .  If the union does not exist, the
labour rents are )w(qw 2 . Note that the union does not maximise ( ) 22 qww −  because the
wage workers would get if not employed by the MNE is zero and not w  (the wage the
MNE would pay if there was no union). Hence, the union will solve the following problem:
(4) Max w q s t w w
w2
2 2 2. . ≥
If this constraint binds, the presence of the union is irrelevant to the wage determination so
for this reason we will assume that it never binds. In this case the equilibrium union wage is:
(5)  w A q2 2 12=
+ β
The second period equilibrium output will then be given by:
(6)  q A q if w
A w q if w2
2 1 2 2
2 1 2
4
2
=
+ =
− + =

( )
( )
β ω
β ω
At the beginning of period two the government chooses whether to legalise the union or not.
Assuming that all profits are repatriated, and in the absence of domestic consumption, the
government’s social welfare function is given by
(7) 22g11 qqG ωρω +=
where ρ g  is the government’s discount factor. It is plausible to assume that the government
may not be able to commit in period one to its policy in period two. In this case, in period
6two the government maximises the function G2=ω2q2 which is equivalent to the union’s
objective function in period two8.   Hence, G2 is maximised by the same value of w2 that is
chosen by the union and given in equation (5). Therefore, assuming the government cannot
commit at the beginning of period one to ban the union in period two, and given no
relocation threat, the best policy in period two is always to legalise the union.
2.2. Period one
In the last stage of period one the MNE chooses the first period output to maximise
the intertemporal profit function:
(8) π ρ= − + −( ) ( )p c q p c qm1 1 1 2 2 2
where ρm is the MNE discount factor.  It is straightforward to solve the MNE’s optimal
problem to find:
(9)  ( )( )q
A m
m1
1 1
2
1 8
2 8
=
+ −
−
αρ β ω
ρ β
Note that the first period output is increasing in α, in the discount factor ρm  and in the
dynamic returns to scale parameter β. The larger are these parameters the greater the
incentive the MNE has to produce above the short-run profit maximising amount to exploit
the higher discounted profit opportunity of the second period.
If there is no union, then the MNE’s wage will be ω 1 = w .  However, if the union is
legalised in period one it will optimally choose the wage to maximise its objective function. It
is plausible that the union has a discount factor which is smaller than that of both the
government and the MNE. We shall later discuss the implications of the case in which
gu ρρ = . First we will consider the case in which the union is more impatient than the
government.  Without too much loss of generality, we shall assume that the union’s discount
factor is zero9 (i.e. 0u =ρ ). Thus, its utility function is U w q1 1 1=  and the optimal wage will
be given by:
(10)  ( )w A m1 1 1 82=
+αρ β /
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  As shown in the next section, this would be modified if the government had a production tax/subsidy
instrument.
9
 Qualitatively, the results will go through for all ρu<ρg. For ease of exposition we focus on the case of ρu=0.   
7Note that the first period union wage is also increasing in α, β,  and ρm . The more the firm
produces in the first period to exploit future profit potential, the larger are the available
short-run rents which can be extracted by the union. Hence, whether or not the
multinational’s export market is contracting or expanding over time will crucially affect the
available labour rents in period one.
Period one output can now be re-written as:
(11) 


=−+
=−−+
=
11
2mm
1
1
2mm
1
1
wif)4/4()8/1(A
wif)8/2(]w)8/1(A[
q
ωβραβρ
ωβρβαρ
It is easy to show that the maximised profit of the MNE is:
(12) π ρ ρ β= + −q q q qm m12 22 1 2
where q1  is given by (11); making use of (9) in (6) and invoking the fact that it is always
optimal to legalise the union in period two, q2   becomes:
(13) [ ]q A
m2
1 1
2
2
8 2
=
+ −
−
α β βω
ρ β /
The MNE will enter if ππ > , where π  reflects outside profit opportunities which we take
as exogenous. This is a standard small open economy assumption.  Given that both q1  and
q2  are ultimately only a function of ω1, the MNE entry condition can be written as:
(14)  0)( 1 >−πωπ
where it is straightforward to show that d
d
π
ω 1
<0.  Thus, the higher is the first period wage
the lower is the present value of the MNE’s profit. Let $( )w π be the wage rate at which
π π= . Then in period one the MNE would not enter in the presence of a union if wˆw1 ≥ .
If, instead, w w1 < $  the presence of a union would not deter the MNE’s entry. Figures 1 and 2
illustrate these two possible entry scenarios:
Figures 1 and 2 about here
There is of course the possibility that w ≥ $w . In this case the MNE will never find it
profitable to enter, even without a union in period one.
In general, the more intense is competition in the world market for FDI, the higher is
the reservation profit and the less likely is entry with a union.
We now turn to stage one of the game where the government chooses the period-one
union legislation. The government’s objective function will be:
8(15) G U Ug( ) ( ) ( )ω ω ρ ω1 1 1 1= +
Unconditional maximisation of this function would set the socially optimal wage for period
one. Note that if the union had the same discount rate as the government it would maximise
the function in (15); in this case, the union wage would be socially optimal. Instead, when the
union is more impatient than the government, the wage it will choose will be above the
optimal level from the government’s point of view.
The function in (15) is concave in 1ω  and will depend on the magnitude of the
structural parameters of the model (α, β, and the discount factors). w  is exogenous and wˆ
is inversely related to π . The ranking in order of magnitude of w , wˆ  and 1w  will be crucial
to determining optimal union legislation policy. The decision regarding union legalisation in
period one depends not only on the magnitude of the MNE’s reservation profit (or wˆ ), but
also on the magnitude of w  (the wage that MNE pays in the absence of a union). Two cases
can be identified.
Case 1: When welfare is higher at w1 =ω  than at 11 w=ω , that is when
)w(G)w(G 1> , the government will find it optimal to ban the union. In this case the
decision to ban is independent of the size of wˆ (and hence of the size of the MNE’s
reservation profits);  the government would ban the union even if the MNE would
enter with unionisation in period one. This case is illustrated in figure 3 below, where
τ is implicitly defined by )w(G)(G 1=τ  and 1w<τ .
Figure 3 about here
Case 1 obtains if w  lies in the interval between τω =1  and 11 w=ω .
Case 2: When welfare is at least as high at 11 w=ω  as it is at w1 =ω , that is
)w(G)w(G 1≤ , two sub-cases emerge. In the first (Case 2.1) wˆw1 ≥  and the
government will find it optimal to ban the union because with a union the MNE
would not enter10. This sub-case is illustrated in Figure 4 below11. In the second sub-
case (Case 2.2),  illustrated in Figure 5, wˆw1 <  and the government will find it
optimal to legalise the union if )w(G)w(G 1<  and be indifferent if )w(G)w(G 1= .
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 Of course, if w w≥ $ then even banning the union would be insufficient to induce entry of the MNE.
11
 In the figure $w is shown on the upward sloping portion of G( )ω 1 , but clearly in Case 2.1 it could be
elsewhere on the curve, provided that w w1 ≥ $ .
9Figures 4 and 5 about here
In both Case 1 and 2 above, illustrated in Figures 3 to 5, 1w  is to the right of the maximum
point on the )(G 1ω  curve. This reflects the assumption that the union has a lower discount
factor than the government. If it did have the same discount factor as the government, 1w
(the wage chosen by the union) would maximise )(G 1ω . In that instance, Case 1 would not
apply because the interval between τ and 1w  would disappear.  Case 1, in which it is optimal
to ban the union because )w(G)w(G 1≥ , can occur only if there is a “time preference
differential” between the union and the government. Note, however, that when there is no
difference in the time preference parameters, that is when gu ρρ = , there will still be a case
for banning the union if wˆw1 > . Clearly, this motive for banning the union is due to a “time
consistency” problem which stems from the sequence of the game, with the MNE having to
make its location decision before the union sets the wage12. Hence, a time consistency
problem would always arise when wˆw1 ≥ , regardless of whether or not the union has the
same discount factor as the government. Thus, although it is more likely when the union is
more impatient than the government, temporary social dumping can occur even when no
difference in time preference exists between the government and the union.
We carried out some simulation exercises on the model. For the parameter values
1A1 ==α , β=0.2, 1mg == ρρ  and 0u =ρ ,  we found13 that 1w  is approximately 0.51
which is above the value of 1ω   (of approximately 0.485) which maximises )(G 1ω .  For
these parameter values, we found that τ is about 0.46.   For π  above approximately 0.12,
we get 1wwˆ >  (as in Figures 1 and 5), and for π  lower than this gives 1wwˆ <  as in the case
of Figures 2 and 4. From these simulations we learn that (1) each of the above cases can
occur, but (2) the interval  ( 1w,τ )  is very  small, so that Case 1 will only be observed for a
very narrow range of parameter values, and (3) 1w  is very close to the level of 1ω  that
maximises )(G 1ω . Hence, somewhat surprisingly, even a big difference between the
                                               
12
 For this move order to be reversed, we would require the union to commit in advance to a wage for an
unrealistically long time. Clearly any wage set before the MNE’s entry is likely to be sub-optimal because it
would be based on a guess about the future profitability of the MNE. Hence we believe the sequence chosen is
by far the most plausible.
13
 The qualitative results are quite robust with respect to changes in these parameter values.
10
discount factor of the government and that of the union does not lead to the wage set by the
union being very far from the socially optimal wage.
Clearly, the nature of the optimal policy towards the legalisation of the union in
period one of the game crucially depends, ceteris paribus, on the magnitude of the MNE’s
reservation profit which is taken to be exogenous in this model. Several factors may be
thought to affect the reservation profits of the MNE. For example, the outside profit of the
MNE will be positively related to the availability of other potential FDI destinations
characterised by favourable conditions, as for instance low labour costs and/or lack of
unionisation. If the multinational’s choice of the host country reflects geographical proximity
considerations to third market destinations, then the reservation profit will also be affected
by the reduction of transport costs and other barriers to trade which may reduce the incentive
of the MNE to invest abroad and may make it more profitable to serve foreign markets from
the home country.
3. PRODUCTION SUBSIDIES
So far we have assumed that the only policy available to the government is union
legislation. A more direct way of attracting the multinational, however, would be through the
use of a fiscal policy instrument such as for example a production subsidy.  In this section we
allow for the use of both production subsidies and union legislation and derive the jointly
optimal policy mix.  Our aim is to discuss how the availability of a fiscal instrument affects
the government’s optimal choice about union legalisation.
The profit function in (8) is thus modified and is now given by:
(16) ( ) ( )π ρ= − + + − +p c s q p c s qm1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
It is straightforward to show that the second period output is:
(17) 



=
++−
=
++
=
wif
2
sqwA
wif
4
sqA
q
2
212
22
212
2
ω
β
ω
β
which collapses to (6) when 0s2 = .  The second period wage is now given by:
(18) 


 ++
=
=
w
2
sqA
w 2122
2
β
ω
As before, we assume that the non-union wage w  is smaller than w2 .
with union
without union
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In either case the government maximises:
(19) 2222 q)s(G −= ω
to yield the optimal subsidy:
 (20) s
for w
w
A q for w
o
2
2 2
2 1
2
0
2
=
=
−
+
=



ω
β
ω
With a union in period two, the optimal policy would be not to tax/subsidise the MNE. In the
absence of a union and when 0 2≤ <w w , we get s
o
2 0< , that is the optimal policy is a tax.
Now, making use of (18) and (20) in (17), we get the output level:
(21) q A q2 2 14=
+ β
Clearly, period two output is the same with and without a union. This means that the
production tax compensates for the existence of the union and can be used to reach the same
real equilibrium. The reason for this is that the tax/subsidy instrument is a perfect rent
extracting substitute for the union. From (18) and (20) it is straightforward to show that the
per-unit rent extracted, i.e. the equilibrium wage net of subsidy, is the same with or without a
union. That is .2/)qA(s 12o22 βω +=−
The second period welfare level will therefore be rewritten as G q2 2
22=   which from
(21) is the same both with and without a union. This implies that, given our simple utilitarian
welfare function, the same welfare level is achieved under both union regimes. If there is no
relocation threat, and the government can use a fiscal instrument to extract rents from the
multinational, the union regime in period two is no longer crucial.
In period one, the MNE maximises the function in (16) to get the output level:
(22) ( )( )q
A sm
m1
1 1 1
2
1 8
2 8
=
+ − +
−
αρ β ω
ρ β
Assuming 0u =ρ , the wage in period one will be:
(23) 
( )
ω
αρ β
1
1
1 11 8
2=
=
+ +


w
A s
w
m /
In stage 1 the government decides its union legalisation and sets its subsidy 1s . As in
the previous section, it may face a binding foreign profit constraint. As a prelude to the
constrained optimal case, let us consider the special case in which the multinational’s entry
with union
without union
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profit constraint is not binding. The government then maximises the following unconstrained
intertemporal welfare function:
(24) ( )G s q qg= − +ω ρ1 1 1 222
It is straightforward to show that the optimal subsidy is:
(25) 1g1
2
g
2
m
1
o
1 A4
q
48
2s αβρβρβρω +


−−−=
Equation holds for both union legalisation regimes, with the appropriate 1ω  given in the
equation (23) above. Substituting from (23) and rearranging yields the unconstrained optimal
subsidy with a union su1  and without a union s
n
1  which are respectively given by:
(26) ( )s A qu g1 1 14 0=
+
>
ρ β α β
and
(27) ( )s s w wn u1 1 1= − −
Notice that there are two effects in determining the sign of the first period subsidy. First,
with or without the union, the government has an incentive to subsidise the MNE to
encourage it to exploit its dynamic economies of scale in order to raise employment and rents
over the two periods. This is captured by equation (26) which is also the first term of (27).
Note that this will be zero if the government had the same degree of impatience as the union.
The second effect occurs in the absence of a union and captures the incentive of the
government to extract rent directly. This effect works towards a tax and is captured by the
second term on the right-hand-side of (27).
To summarise, optimal subsidies tend to fall through time. With a union legalised in
both periods it is optimal to subsidise in period one but to set the second period subsidy
equal to zero. Without a union it may be optimal to subsidise in the first period but it will
always be optimal to tax in period two.
It proves useful to consider the “first-period per-unit rent”, defined as 111 s−= ωδ ,
which gives us a measure of the rent extracted (i.e. the wage net of subsidy ) by the country
from the MNE in that period. Hence, we can think of the optimal policy as one of choosing
the optimal per-unit rent. The first-period optimal policy can then be re-written as
(28) u11o11o1 sws −=−= ωδ .                                                                                                        
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It is clear from (28) that, given the union legislation, the optimal policy can be thought of as
choosing the “first-period per-unit rent” in order to maximise the welfare function in (24).
Clearly we would expect that the amount of rent that can be extracted will be less if the
government has to take account of a binding entry constraint. When the MNE’s profit
constraint is binding, the government optimisation problem will be to maximise the
lagrangian
(29) ( ) ( )L q qg( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )δ λ δ δ ρ δ λ π δ π1 1 1 1 1 2 12= + + −
to  yield
(30) )(
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q
48
2 1
2
m
1
g
1
2
g
2
mc
1 δπλ
βραβρβρβρδ ′



−+−



−−=
where c1δ  is defined as the constrained optimal first-period per-unit rent. It is straightforward
to show that equation (30) implies a higher level of subsidisation than in the unconstrained
case. It is also easy to show that an increase in the MNE’s reservation profit reduces the
ability of the home country to extract rent.
It is clear that welfare is the same with or without the union, because the government
will use the subsidy to correct for the presence of the union. The equality of the welfare
outcomes across union regimes then implies that even in period one union legalisation is no
longer the crucial factor in the attempt to attract FDI. This goes against the popular
perception that unionisation is a major deterrent of FDI.
Clearly, the simple welfare function we use takes no explicit account of political
economy considerations which may be particularly relevant in a developing economy setting.
These may include international pressure to legalise unions, dead-weight costs associated
with raising taxation, and inefficient activities such as government corruption. Note,
however, that to the extent that these factors are important,  they may bias the decision in
favour of union legalisation. Essentially there are two ways of extracting rent from the MNE:
taxes and higher wages. If for example, the public administration suffers from high levels of
inefficiencies and corruption, then higher wages may have an advantage over taxation in that
the extracted rents go directly into the hands of the private sector. Of course governments
may have other political motives for banning unions, but these are unlikely to be welfare
increasing. Also, a policy based on production subsidy may be difficult, if raising the funds to
finance it imposes a dead-weight cost on society. If a production subsidy could only be used
with a positive social cost of funds, then it will  not be a perfect substitute for union
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legislation. If the social cost of fund was prohibitively high, so that a production subsidy
could not be used, the relevance of the analysis of section 2 would be strengthened.
Finally, note that if the government could control the union, as in the case of an
official state union, then it could set the wage 11w δ=  before the MNE enters, thus
rendering production subsidies redundant, though even in this case time consistency issues
may arise.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have explored the strategic use of labour union legalisation by a
developing country’s government concerned with attracting inward FDI.
We show that when considering whether to legalise the unions or not, the host
country government faces a trade-off. On the one hand unions represent an attractive tool for
rent extraction in the presence of foreign multinationals. On the other hand, however,
unionisation can make the location in the host country less attractive to the foreign investor.
This trade-off raises the incentive for the host country government to use temporary social
dumping in the form of  restricted union rights.
Another of our results shows that production subsidies can circumvent the need to
engage in this form of social dumping. That is, if the government has another fiscal
instrument at its disposal, union legalisation is no longer a crucial factor in attracting inward
FDI. This result goes against the popular perception that unionisation is a major deterrent of
FDI.
A production subsidy is a direct way of raising employment, but another policy
instrument which could be considered is lump-sum profit subsidies/taxes. If the government
can use both of these fiscal instruments, then it would set the after tax profit of the
multinational just equal to the latter’s reservation profit thus ensuring inward FDI and at the
same extracting all available rent. The outcome would be independent of union legislation, in
line with our result in Section 3.
In this paper the focus was on the possibility of temporary rather than permanent
social dumping.  Although the temporary aspect clearly requires us to use a multi-period
model, optimal social dumping per-se could of course emerge in other settings, including
single-period ones. For example, intra-temporal positive externalities between the MNE and
the rest of the local economy may also create such an incentive.
15
One could extend the model in a number of ways. For example, the inclusion of an
export oriented domestic sector would  allow for the modelling of one of the main attractions
of inward FDI for developing countries,  namely the positive technological externalities from
foreign MNEs to the domestic economy. Such externalities, however, are likely to strengthen
the case for temporary social dumping, since they would make inward FDI more attractive to
the host country’s government. Hence this would be unlikely to significantly alter the basic
insights of the current model. Also, the model developed here rules out by assumption the
possibility of MNE’s relocation. Clearly, a relocation threat is a reality in many industries,
particularly those characterised by relatively low set up and relocation costs. Relocation, by
strengthening competition between countries, would make the danger of a “race to the
bottom” in labour standards more likely, thus increasing an LDC’s government incentives for
social dumping. Explicitly allowing for this in this framework would be fairly straightforward
and probably have fairly obvious implications.
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Figure 1.  The case where the MNE will enter in the presence of a period one union
Figure 2. The case where the MNE will not enter in the presence of a period one union
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Figure 3.  Case 1: )w(G)w(G 1>
Not optimal for the Government to legalise period  one union
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Figure 5.  Case 2.2: )w(G)w(G 1 ≥  and wˆw1 <
Optimal for the Government to legalise period  one union
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